145 F.3d 1343
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Penny MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Zack Franklin, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 97-50331, 97-50339.
D.C. No. CR-96-00122-AHS-3.
D.C. No. CR-96-00122-AHS-2.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted April 20, 1998.**
Decided April 27, 1998.
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Alicemarie H. Stotler, District Judge, Presiding.
Before BRUNETTI, RYMER, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM*
Penny Moore and Zack Franklin appeal their sentences imposed following guilty pleas to conspiracy to distribute and distribution of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Moore and Franklin contend that under the law of the case doctrine the district court should have calculated the same base offense level for them as was calculated for codefendant Gambill. This contention lacks merit.
We review the legality of a guideline sentence de novo. See United States v. Garcia, 112 F.3d 395, 397 (9th Cir.1997). Here, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable as Moore and Franklin do not point to any factual findings in the record that support their contention that the district court found that codefendant Gambill had a base offense level of 32 at his sentencing hearing. The district judge specifically stated, "it's not as though the court said, 'oh, well, really it was a 32-offense level, as a matter of fact, and that's a permanent finding.' " Accordingly, the law of the case doctrine does not apply. See United States v. Houser, 804 F.2d 565, 567-568 (9th Cir.1986) (explaining that for the doctrine to apply the issue in question must have been decided in the previous disposition). Additionally, sentencing disparity "among codefendants is not, by itself, a sufficient ground for attacking an otherwise proper sentence under the guidelines." See United States v. Taylor, 991 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir.1993). Accordingly, the district court did not err in calculating Moore's and Franklin's base offense level. See Garcia, 112 F.3d at 397.
AFFIRMED.