142 F3d 446 United States of America v. Lautz

142 F.3d 446

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Christopher Raymond LAUTZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-30256.
D.C. No. CR-96-00397-MFM-01.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 20, 1998.**
Decided April 29, 1998.

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Malcolm F. Marsh, District Judge, Presiding.

Before BRUNETTI, RYMER, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

1

MEMORANDUM*

2

Christopher Raymond Lautz appeals his sentence for conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, for theft or receipt of stolen mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. Lautz contends that the district court erred by imposing a three-level upward departure from Criminal History Category VI. See United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") § 4A1.3 (1995). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court's decision to depart from the sentencing ranges in the Guidelines for an abuse of discretion, see United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2043, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), and we affirm.

3

The district court concluded that a three-level upward departure was justified because the features of Lautz's case took it outside the heartland of typical cases.1 See Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2044. The court outlined the factors it relied upon in departing: (1) Lautz's eighteen felony and fourteen misdemeanor convictions, which resulted in a criminal history score of fifty-nine; (3) his criminal conduct was undeterred and uninterrupted; (4) his proclivity for acquiring other people's property made him a danger to the public; and (5) an extremely high likelihood that he would reoffend.

4

Lautz argues that the district court erred in departing because his crimes were neither escalating in nature nor of accelerating seriousness. An upward departure from category VI, however, may be based upon a defendant's repetition of a series of offenses that are the same or similar to the crime of conviction. See United States v. Segura-Del Real, 83 F.3d 275, 276 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 328, 136 L.Ed.2d 242 (1996).

5

In its decision to depart, the district court properly considered the nature of Lautz's prior convictions and the similarity of many of his prior offenses to his current offense of possession of stolen mail. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 comment.; Segura-Del Real, 83 F.3d at 277-78. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in departing upward three levels. Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2043; United States v. Sablan, 114 F.3d 913, 916 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 851, 139 L.Ed.2d 752 (1998).

6

AFFIRMED.

**

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

1

Lautz does not challenge the extent of the district court's departure in this appeal